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It is a great honor for me to be here this evening. 
I want to thank all of you for giving me this 
opportunity, and, in particular I want to thank two 
people. 
Akihiko Funaoka, president of the Japan Business 
Association, and Professor Hugh Patrick of the 
Columbia Business School. Both have been very 
helpful in making my appearance here possible. 
Thank you, gentlemen. 
I must admit I always feel a bit nervous when I 
speak before graduate students — and their 
professors. 
It sounds impressive when you hear that I'm a 
graduate in economics from Keio University. But in 
fact, I was not a very good student. In my college 
days, I was much more interested in American movies 
than I was in classes and textbooks. 
I know you've all heard about how tough the 
Japanese educational system is. And it is tough. 
In elementary and secondary school, we have to work 
very, very hard. 
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But not in college. College is the big secret. 
It's a four-year vacation. In Japan we feel that 
college students are entitled to it. In between 12 
years of hard work in school and a lifetime of hard 
work on the job. 
I let you in on the secret so you? 11 know why I get 
nervous when ITm with people who have had a real 
college education. 
So don't expect an academic lecture from me. I 
didn't learn much about economics in college. 
On the other hand, in the forty years since then, I 
have learned a few things about international 
business. 
I learned them as a salesman who first came to this 
country in 1954 with two suitcases full of very 
good products that no one wanted to buy. It took 
me almost two years to start selling my first 
Minolta cameras. 
It was a wonderful way to learn about market-driven 
demand, consumer research and the necessity of 
adapting products for export. 
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Many of my colleagues from other Japanese companies 
had a similar education in those days. We learned 
a lot about international markets, and many of us 
went on to become high officials in our firms. 
I wish there were more people in American 
manufacturing firms who had a similar education. 
Not long ago I attended a meeting of a charitable 
organization at the offices of a bank overlooking 
Fifth Avenue and the skating rink at Rockefeller 
Center. 
The beautiful room we were in, with its wonderful 
view, used to be the board room of the Singer 
Sewing Machine Company. 
When I heard that, it made me very sad. What had 
been the board room of a major American 
manufacturing company is now the board room of a 
bank. 
In many countries of the world, the name Singer 
used to be the word for sewing machine — the way 




Now, if you want to see a Made in the U.S.A. Singer 
sewing machine, you have to go the Smithsonian 
Museum in Washington — or maybe to the attic in 
your grandmotherfs house. 
All the sewing machines today are made in places 
like Japan and Korea. 
At the Smithsonian, you can see all kinds of 
wonderful American inventions and manufactured 
products than once dominated world markets. 
At the Smithsonian you can even see the first 
camera ever used in space — a Minolta Hi-Matic. 
But Minolta still makes cameras. Singer doesn't 
make sewing machines. Hoover doesn't manufacture 
vacuum cleaners. RCA doesn't make television sets. 
In fact, RCA doesn't even own the RCA building. 
And the Singer board room belongs to a bank. 
I have nothing against banks. In fact, like 
everybody else who pays taxes in America, a lot of 
my money goes to keeping banks in business. 
And I realize that both America and Japan have 
become post-industrial societies. 
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There is merit in having some of our manufacturing 
done in countries other than our own. 
Minolta, like other internationalized companies, 
manufactures some of its products in countries 
where costs are lower than they are in Japan. 
But there is no merit — or wisdom — in letting 
the control of the manufacturing process — and the 
quality of our manufactured products — get away 
from us to the extent that America has. 
There are fundamental differences in the way Japan 
and America have faced the globalization of 
industry. My own life might serve as a metaphor 
for these differences. 
I have lived in this country far longer than I have 
in Japan. I have become Americanized, but, as you 
can tell from my accent, I am still very Japanese. 
Minolta sells more cameras and copiers in this 
country than we do in Japan. And Europe is our 
fastest growing market. Like other Japanese 
companies, Minolta operates on a global basis. 
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The successful globalization of major Japanese 
corporations is, to a degree, the result of our 
handicaps. 
Japan is a relatively small, densely populated 
island nation. We rely almost entirely on fuel 
imports to keep our factories running, to power our 
cars, to heat our homes. 
To earn the foreign currency we need to pay for 
those imports, we must export heavily. 
In addition, because our domestic market is 
relatively small, we need foreign markets to keep 
our factories working at cost-efficient levels. 
These economic factors force Japan to think 
globally. Oddly enough, the United States, which 
certainly thinks globally in political terms, is 
relatively provincial in its economic thinking — 
at least at the corporate level. 
Itfs easy to see why. The United States is by far 
the world's biggest and richest market. 
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For many years, most American firms were content to 
concentrate on meeting domestic needs. ItTs only 
in recent years, as foreign competition has 
increased, that American firms have battled harder 
for exports. 
Long before Japan, however, American firms went 
global in terms of openiTig factories and investing 
in foreign countries. 
The American news media have given considerable 
coverage to recent Japanese investment in this 
country. But the facts remain that the United 
States is by far the world's biggest investor in 
foreign countries. And Great Britain, not Japan, 
is by far the biggest foreign investor in America. 
Minolta is perhaps an extreme example of Japanese 
dependence on exports. Fully 80 percent of our 
production goes to export, the highest export ratio 
of any company listed on the Tokyo stock exchange. 
But we are not as truly global as we might be. 
The United States is by far our biggest market. 
Europe is growing rapidly. 
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Hong Kong has been a big market for us for many 
years. But it is only recently that, like most 
Japanese companies, we have begun to sell more 
heavily in other Asian markets. We also do very 
little business in Africa. 
In addition to our heavy export marketing, we do 
some of our manufacturing in Malaysia, Brazil and 
Germany. We even have a small toner plant here in 
Goshen, New York. 
But Minolta remains committed to very traditional 
Japanese ways of doing business. 
We are still more committed to the science of 
manufacturing than we are to the art of the deal. 
We remain more committed to long-term results than 
to a quick return on investment and the tyranny of 
the quarterly report. 
In this way, too, we are very different from 
Americans. 
Why is it that among the buzz words of our times 
"quality circles" are associated with Japan and 
"junk bonds" are viewed as an American invention? 
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Quality versus junk. Manufacturing versus 
financial deals. 
One reason I had so much trouble trying to sell my 
wonderful Minolta cameras when I first came to this 
country was that Japanese products in general and 
Japanese cameras in particular had the reputation 
of being junk — or toys. 
We had a bad reputation to overcome. And it took 
us a long time to do it. But we were willing to 
take a long time to succeed in the global market. 
American products at that time had a great 
reputation. Yes, America had given the world the 
sewing machine, the vacuum cleaner, the safety 
razor. But also the automobile, the airplane, the 
computer, the photocopier — just about all of the 
products that we take for granted in our homes and 
on our jobs. 
What has America given us lately? 
Junk bonds? The leveraged buyout? The savings and 
loan bailout? 
Is Japan so very different? 
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Yes. We are very different. 
We do have our financial and political scandals. 
We also have a very inefficient retail distribution 
system. 
Like America, we have a very inefficient system of 
farm subsidies, particularly for rice growers in 
our case. 
We have our problems and shortcomings. But when it 
comes to the globalization of the economy, we 
understand what's going on. 
And we are committed to taking the patient, long-
term approach necessary for success. In this 
respect, we are very different from what I see at 
work in America. 
If I may make a bad play on words, it is the 
difference between the fast buck mentality and a 
patient yen for success. 
The fast buck versus the patient yen seems to sum 
up differences between America and Japan at all 




Upward mobility motivates people in both countries. 
But in Japan, we view upward mobility as a slow 
climb up the corporate ladder within one company. 
Americans are too impatient for that. Here, upward 
mobility often involves changing jobs and taking 
advantage of the tremendous opportunities Americans 
have for social and geographic mobility. 
Even in marriage, Americans seem be wed to the 
short-term. One-half of all marriages in America 
end in divorce. In Japan, the divorce rate is 
growing, but it is still under 10 percent. 
Americans seem willing to change their jobs, or 
their marriage partners, as often as they change 
their socks. 
In Japan, we are more patient — with marriage 
partners, with careers and with corporate 
strategies. 
Life-time employment carries with it a two-way 
sense of loyalty between employer and employee. 
Success for the employee grows from success for the 
company. And the success of the company grows from 
the efforts of its employees at every level. 
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But life-time employment is only one side of the 
coin, and its extent and effects have, I believe, 
been somewhat exaggerated. 
On the other hand, what might be called "life-time 
investment" has not been so widely discussed. 
In the case of Minolta, for example, only about 20 
percent of our stock is likely to be traded on the 
Tokyo stock exchange. 
In general, about 70 percent of the stock in major 
Japanese companies is held by institutional 
investors. Most of this stock is very closely held 
by the keiretsu, or convoy, that is made up of a 
manufacturer, its banks, trading companies and 
major suppliers. 
This stock rarely changes hands. Which means that 
our stockholders have a loyalty that parallels the 
loyalty of workers who benefit from life-time 
employment. 
In fact, the relationship between life-time 
employment and what I have termed life-time 
investment deserves closer study. 
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I suspect that it is more than coincidence that 
life-time employment tends to be found only in 
those major companies that are listed on the Tokyo 
stock exchange. Smaller companies are less 
committed to life-time employment. 
There may be an interesting thesis for someone at 
the Center for Japanese Economy and Business on the 
importance of life-time investment in Japan — and 
its relation to life-time employment. 
Because stockholders in major Japanese companies 
tend to be our business partners, they regard their 
investment almost as a form of insurance, an asset 
rather than a liability. 
Investments are made, not for speculation, but for 
a long-term commitment of capital with the 
expectation of a reasonable return on investment 
over the long haul. 
This investment approach has important implications 
for long-term global strategy. 
It liberates the Japanese corporation to pursue 
international markets with the patient, long-term 
strategy that global markets demand. 
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And it liberates top-level management from the 
pressures of hungry stockholders and critical stock 
analysts. 
In addition to the benefits of life-time 
investment, Japanese corporations also benefit from 
a unique relationship with their banks. To a far 
greater degree than is true in America, Japanese 
banks are a source of capital through loans. 
Japan's high rate of savings creates ample funds 
for borrowing at relatively low interest rates. 
The combination of life-time investment and low-
interest bank loans gives Japanese corporations a 
financial advantage over their American 
competitors. This advantage is often overlooked by 
analysts in search of reasons for Japan's 
competitive edge. 
Capital formation in Japan also benefits from 
government policies which discourage a high rate of 
consumption and of consumer borrowing while 
encouraging a high savings rate. In the United 
States, government polices prevail that are almost 
the direct opposite of Japan's. 
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Progressive income taxes — up to •?©• percent with 
relatively few loopholes — discourage Japanese 
from pursuing the very high personal incomes earned 
by some corporate leaders in America. 
Short-term capital gains are also discouraged by 
extremely high taxes. 
On balance, Japanese tax policies provide 
incentives to savings and disincentives to private 
debt and short-term speculation. 
For many years, Japan's tax-free savings system,' 
known as maruyu, provided a major incentive for 
Japanese to save. Japanese paid no tax on the 
interest earned from bank and postal savings 
accounts. 
By 1988, personal savings in Japan had grown to 
$2.4 trillion. This enormous cash cushion gave 
banks impressive reserves that could be used for 
low-interest loans to expanding companies. 
Coupled with the high foreign currency reserves 
that resulted from Japan's trade surplus, Japanese 




According to one estimate, the cost of capital in 
real terms in Japan is about one-third the cost of 
capital in the United States. 
Money — low-cost capital — has been the secret 
ingredient in JapanTs global economic success 
story. That's the good news. 
The bad news is that Japan, reacting to American 
pressure, changed its tax laws in 1988. We now pay 
a 20 percent tax on savings account interest. 
However, old habits die hard. Despite the new tax 
disincentive, Japanese have gone right on saving. 
According to the International Savings Bank 
Institute, per capita savings in Japan rose 10 
percent last year, to $45,000. 
That's still by far the highest rate in the world. 
Switzerland, that nation of bankers, ranks second 
with just under $20,000, less than half the per 
capita savings rate in Japan. 
And Japan's rate is more than 10 times higher than 
the U. S. rate. Among major industrial nations, 
only Italy has a lower savings rate than America. 
- more -
17 
One savings incentive that Americans did enjoy — 
briefly — was the universaly deductible Individual 
Retirement Account. 
But the IRA tax benefits were dropped in the 
interest of increasing tax revenues and reducing 
the federal deficit. 
The federal deficit continues to grow, but 
Americans lost an incentive to save. 
By contrast, Americans still enjoy tax incentives 
on some forms of debt, such as home mortgages. 
Until 1986, interest paid on many other forms of 
debt was also tax deductible. 
In short, American tax policy has tended to 
discourage people from saving and to encourage 
people to borrow. 
The advent of home equity loans has made the 
problem even worse. Although first mortgages are a 
form of borrowing, home ownership has been a major 
form of investment savings for Americans. 
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But the home equity loan creates an attractive form 
of debt. And many Americans now borrow heavily on 
their homes. 
Partly as a result of such policies, net national 
savings in this country dropped from 10.8 percent 
of gxoss national product in the 1960s to four 
percent in the 1980s. 
That compares to a net national savings rate in 
Japan of about 21 percent. 
Think about it. A four percent savings rate in 
America compared to a 21 percent rate in Japan. 
No wonder Japanese banks can play so important a 
role as a source of low-cost financing for Japanese 
corporations. 
Particularly in the early days of JapanTs export 
expansion, around the mid-1950s, this was our major 
source of financing for global operations. 
Today our main source of capital for foreign 
expansion comes from the sale of export products. 
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This also makes us very different from America in 
our approach to globalization. 
Japan's apparent trade surplus — I stress apparent 
for a reason I will discuss in a moment — Japan's 
apparent trade surplus earns the foreign currency 
we need, not only to pay for our fuel imports, but 
also to further expand our export growth, 
America's apparent trade deficit, by contrast, 
shrinks America's foreign currency reserves, 
increases the cost of foreign investment and tends 
to make American corporations more cautious in 
terms of globalization. 
On the other hand, the fall in the value of the 
dollar has made American manufactured products less 
expensive in foreign markets. This has increased 
American exports to their highest level ever, more 
than double what they were five years ago. 
But the trade deficit remains high because of 
America's endless appetite for imports. 
Another big difference between America's approach 
to globalization compared to Japan's is a tribute 
to the sophistication of American corporations. 
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America is far ahead of Japan, or any other 
country, in the extent of its off-shore sourcing. 
So extensive and successful have America's 
multinational corporations been with this policy 
that I seriously doubt that there is a real trade 
deficit between our two countries. 
In my autobiography, which was published in this 
country two years ago, I made what I considered a 
very bold statement. 
I said, and I quote n. . .at present, the United 
States does not have a trade deficit with Japan. 
In fact, if we had a better measuring rod, we might 
discover that there's a trade surplus.11 
I am more convinced than ever that that is true. 
For the past quarter of a century ITve been 
involved in the international marketing of photo 
and business equipment products. Of necessity, my 
study of international trade has not been casual. 
But Ifm amazed that so many business leaders, 
economists, market analysts and governmental policy 
makers often base their conclusions on a 
superficial reading of misleading data. 
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Ifxn not a statistician, but I do know how to count. 
And I know we canTt count on the most widely 
accepted statistics to give us an accurate picture 
of what's going on in international trade. 
There are several reasons why statistics that show 
a continuing United States1 trade deficit with 
Japan are misleading. 
First, they are measured in current United States 
dollars, and no adjustment is made for the fact 
that the value of the American dollar has fallen 
more than fifty percent in relation to the Japanese 
yen since 1985. 
The value of Japanese and most European goods 
imported into the United States would have had to 
fall by more than fifty percent since 1985 for the 
United States1 trade deficit as currently measured 
to show any reduction at all in dollar terms. 
If trade with Japan and Europe actually had fallen 
fifty percent, the resulting disruption of 
international trade patterns would have sparked a 
worldwide depression. 
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standards, continue to set United States1 deficit 
reduction goals that, if achieved, would cause an 
international disaster. 
I donft think this is a very effective approach to 
managing the globalization of the economy. 
In 1984, the bilateral United States trade deficit 
with Japan, measured in dollars, was reported as 
$31.2 billion. 
In 1989, that deficit was measured at more than 
$49 billion, an increase of 57 percent, as measured 
in dollars. 
But Japanese don't live on dollars. They live on 
yen. 
Measured in yen, the bilateral trade deficit 
between Japan and the United States showed a slight 
decrease between 1984 and 1989. 
Last year, 1990, the bilateral trade deficit 
between our two countries fell sharply to about 32 
billion dollars. For the first half of this year, 
the deficit ran at about the same rate. 
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But preliminary figures for recent months indicate 
that the deficit may again be on the way up. 
We are still talking about the apparent deficit, 
measured in dollars. 
However, because the dollar is the internationally 
accepted medium of exchange, Japan, like most 
nations, reports its own trade figures in dollars. 
As a result, even Japanese trade officials are 
defensive about the United States1 apparently still 
very high trade deficit with Japan. 
Since my whole professional life has been built on 
international trade, I take these data distortions 
very personally. 
The dollar-based data used to measure international 
trade are additionally misleading because no 
adjustment is made for the price increases that 
Japanese companies have been forced to make to 




But in measuring the trade balance by current 
standards, we account for neither the fall in the 
value of the dollar or the increase in the cost of 
imports, nor for any corresponding decrease in the 
cost of American exports. 
My own guess is that such adjustments would cut the 
apparent American trade deficit at least in half. 
Competition for market share forces Minolta to a 
level of restraint in our price increases that has 
cut severely into operating income. But some 
American industries don't show comparable 
restraint. Take autos, for example. 
The American auto industry had an excellent 
opportunity to win back market share from the 
Japanese manufacturers who were forced to increase 
prices. But the American firms, lured by the 
opportunity for short-term profits, took advantage 
of the rising prices on Japanese cars to raise 
their own prices. 
As a result, they did not regain market share and 
imports of Japanese and other foreign cars went 
right on increasing. 
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That's another big difference in the way American 
multinational firms do business compared to the way 
Japanese firms operate in the global market. 
The only effective restraint on American imports of 
Japanese autos has been the system of voluntary 
quotas adopted by Japanese manufacturers under 
pressure from the United States1 government. 
Americans continue to be willing to pay heavy price 
premiums for Japanese cars. And the dollar volume 
of Japanese auto imports has gone up even more 
because the manufacturers have begun exporting more 
luxury cars to the United States. 
In addition, the Japanese auto manufacturers 
expanded their production facilities in this 
country, which helps them overcome the effects of 
both the weaker dollar and the quotas on the number 
of vehicles they can export to the United States. 
In the auto industry, at least, the overall effect 
of the weaker dollar has been to increase Japanese 
product penetration in the United States, exactly 
the opposite of the intended effect. 
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Another of "the major drawbacks in currently 
accepted trade statistics is that they measure only 
goods actually shipped from one country to another, 
but donft reflect overall product penetration that 
includes, for example, products manufactured or 
sold by American firms operating in Japan. 
In an important study based on 1984 data, Kenichi 
Ohmae showed that in terms of total product 
penetration, including exports and products 
produced overseas, Japan and the United States were 
just about equally balanced. 
Ohmae, in a 1987 article in The McKinsey Quarterly, 
showed that United States exports to Japan in 1984 
totaled $25.6 billion, but the 300 largest American 
firms operating in Japan, out of a total of 3,000, 
sold another $43.9 billion in American products in 
Japan for a total product penetration of $69.5 
billion. 
Japan's exports to the United States that year 
totaled $56.8 billion, but Japanese firms operating 
in the United States added only $12.8 billion in 
Japanese product penetration in the United States 
for a total of $69.6 billion. 
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If only exports and imports were measured, the 
United States trade deficit with Japan would appear 
to have been $31.2 billion. 
In terms of total product penetration, the deficit 
falls to practically nothing — only $100 million. 
Even that's only part of the picture because 
American firms in one recent year earned $800 
million in licensing fees from Japanese firms for 
the rights to manufacture another $60 billion in 
American brand-name goods. 
And there are another 2,700 American firms in Japan 
whose sales weren't even included in this study. 
Overall, it appears rather clear that, if trade 
data were adjusted for currency devaluation, price 
inflation, and total product penetration, America 
would show a trade surplus with Japan. But it will 
take a major re-education effort to convince most 
policy makers of that probability. 
The figures I've been quoting are based on 1984 
data. So they are badly out of date. To the best 
of my knowledge, neither Kenichi Ohmae nor anyone 
else has updated that study. 
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This might be another subject worthy of 
investigation by an enterprising graduate student. 
I wonder if I could do some business here as a 
faculty adviser? 
International trade is too important for us to rely 
on outmoded standards that donft take into account 
the globalization of production. 
For example, a Chevy Spectrum, made in Japan by 
Isuzu for its joint venture partner, General 
Motors, has an American nameplate. But is it an 
American car? 
Is a Toyota Camry, made in Kentucky by American 
workers, a Japanese car? And how should either of 
those cars be counted in figuring out America's 
balance of trade with Japan? 
To me, discussing the trade balance between Japan 
and the United States has become about as 
significant as discussing the trade balance between 
New York and New Jersey. 
I earn my living by working in New Jersey. My wife 
goes shopping in New York. It all balances out. 
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American business and political leaders and the 
mass media continue to be highly critical of 
Japan's trade policies. 
I respect the sensitivities of the people of 
America on the issue of trade with Japan. There is 
more that Japan can do to open key markets, such as 
financial services, to foreign firms. 
Japan, however, already has taken many steps to 
open its markets. But most of the resulting 
increase in imports has come from other Asian 
countries and Europe, not the United States. 
Since the yen began to climb in value in 1985, 
Japan's total imports increased 40 percent. 
However, most of the increase has come from Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and, 
to a lesser extent, Malaysia. 
Imports from Europe have also been increasing, 




Back in 1980, imported 35 millimeter cameras 
accounted for only 7.7 percent of the market in 
Japan. By 1987, that was up to more than 46 
percent. 
Thatfs not too bad for Minolta, since most of our 
production is for export. But it does tell you 
something about the relative openness of the 
Japanese market. Even the camera market. 
The market share of imported sewing machines also 
went way up, from less than nine percent to more 
than 30 percent. 
But none of that increase came from sewing machines 
made in America. 
Which brings us full circle, back to that wonderful 
room in Rockefeller Center that used to be the 
board room of the Singer Sewing Machine Company and 
now belongs to a bank. 
Perhaps by now, some of you may agree with my 
original thought, that, yes, there is something 
wrong with the way America has let its 
manufacturing base decline. 
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And, yes, there are some problems in the way 
America has managed its role in today's global 
economy. 
Perhaps you may have also picked up some ideas 
about what America might do to improve its 
position. 
I hope so. Thank you. 
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